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Welcome to the Spring 2015 issue of Network Industries 
Quarterly! For the first time in its history an issue of Network 
Industries Quarterly is exclusively dedicated to the evolution of 
network industries outside of Europe, in this case in Eurasia.
The first article (Akkemik and Li) focusses on recent regu-
latory reforms in the energy market in China, assessing the 
potential impacts of changes in energy prices in China on pro-
ducer prices in various sectors. The second article (Cetinkaya, 
Basaran and Bagdadioglu) discusses the main obstacles to the 
liberalization of the Turkish electricity sector. The third article 
(Eroglu) focuses on the role of the regulatory authorities in 
Turkey’s liberalized electricity market. And the fourth article 
(Oguz and Benli) discusses fixed-mobile substitution in the 
context of Turkey’s telecommunications liberalization process.
All four contributions go back to an inaugural Conference 
on network industries in Eurasia, held at the Social Sciences 
University in Ankara in November 2014 and which will be held 
annually from now on. Similar conferences will be organized by 
network-industries.org in other parts of the world, notably in 
Africa and Latin America in 2016 and beyond.
We hope that you find these contributions interesting and 
support Network Industries Quarterly’s reaching out to emer-
ging countries in the future.
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Network Industries Quarterly | Published four times a year, contains information 
about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network industries 
in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current issues. The 
editor establishes caps, headings, sub-headings, introductory abstract and inserts in ar-
ticles. He also edits the articles. Opinions are the sole responsibility of the author(s). 
Subscription | The subscription is free. Please do register at <http://newsletter.epfl.ch/
mir/> to be alerted upon publication. Letters | We do publish letters from readers. 
Please include a full postal address and a reference to the article under discussion. The 
letter will be published along with the name of the author and country of residence. Send 
your letter (maximum 450 words) to the editor-in-chief. Letters may be edited. 
Publication directors | Matthias Finger
Guest Editor | Matthias Finger  | Email: matthias.finger@epfl.ch
Managing Editor | Nadia Bert, David Kupfer, Mohamad Razaghi 
Founding editor | Matthias Finger 
Publishers | Chair MIR, Matthias Finger, director, EPFL-CDM, Building Odyssea, 
Station 5, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland (phone: +41.21.693.00.02; fax: +41.21.693. 
00.80; email: <mir@epfl.ch>; web-site: <http://mir.epfl.ch/> 
ISSN 1662-6176 Published in Switzerland
Barriers to competition in the Turkish electricity 
market - Murat Cetinkaya, Alparslan A. Basaran, 
Necmiddin Bagdadioglu
Regulating Electricity Markets via Competition 
Regulation rather than Sector-Specific Regulation: 
What are the Consequences in Turkey? - Muzaffer 
Eroğlu
The Impact of Energy Price Deregulation on 
Sectoral Producer Prices in China - K. Ali Akkemik, 
Jia Li
19 Fixed-Mobile Substitution in the Turkish 
Telecommunications Market - Fuat Oğuz, Erman 
Benli
25
13
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        3 
1. Introduction
Rapid growth and urbanization in China have resulted in 
increased demand for energy. In recent years, the indus-
trial structure has shifted towards more energy-consuming 
heavy industries, which has further increased energy de-
mand. To tackle the challenges posed by such problems, 
the Chinese Government has recently introduced various 
reforms to enhance energy efficiency and promote ener-
gy-saving technologies. The government has also imple-
mented deregulatory reforms to bring energy prices closer 
to market-clearing levels. Inefficiencies in the energy sec-
tors due to price distortions including subsidies have been 
well-reported (Hang and Tu, 2007). 
The present paper examines the effects that changes 
in energy prices following deregulation in prices are likely 
to have on sectoral producer prices. Specifically, energy 
prices are expected to increase in China. Since energy is an 
important input to varying degrees across economic acti-
vities, changing energy prices will have a direct impact on 
the price level of the activity. On the other hand, indirect 
price effects work through inter-sectoral linkages across 
sectors. To quantify such effects, we employ the social 
accounting matrix (SAM) price modeling technique and 
SAMs for China for the years 2002 and 2007. 
2. Energy Price Deregulation in China
Since the opening of the Chinese economy from 1978 
onwards, the Chinese energy sector has experienced signi-
ficant reforms. Before the reforms, the strategy for energy 
production, distribution, and investments was defined in 
five-year plans, while the operation was directed by annual 
plans. All energy prices were determined by the central 
government and often maintained at very low levels. After 
1978, large-scale institutional reforms in the energy sector 
were undertaken by the Chinese central government. To 
date, energy reforms have mainly targeted electricity and 
coal markets, the most important energy sources in China. 
In the case of oil and natural gas markets, the central go-
vernment’s regulations were very strict, since natural gas 
and oil are largely imported. 
Energy pricing has always been an important part of 
the energy sector reforms in China. Following the ope-
ning up of the economy, a dual-track pricing system was 
introduced in the 1980s whereby the central plan set the 
prices for the plan segment of the energy sector and these 
prices were gradually replaced by the market prices for the 
market segment of the energy sector (Wu 2003, Hang and 
Tu 2007). By the early 1990s, energy prices had largely 
been liberalized, but price controls were reintroduced in 
1994 due to high inflation in 1993 (Hang and Tu, 2007). 
Following the acceleration of energy price reforms after 
1996, plan allocation of energy was largely abolished in 
the late 1990s and this affected energy prices (Hang and 
Tu, 2007). 
In the oil sector, where China is largely dependent on 
imports, domestic oil prices are subsidized. The dual-track 
pricing system was abandoned in the oil sector after 1994 
and the central government started to strictly control oil 
prices (Wu 2003, Hang and Tu 2007). After 1998, howe-
ver, domestic oil prices have been set with reference to the 
changes in world prices (Zhao et al., 2009). 
Coal is by far the most liberalized energy sector in 
China. Coal is the most important input for electricity 
generation and the price of coal used in electricity genera-
tion facilities has therefore been under strict government 
control. Substantial liberalization was introduced in the 
coal sector after 1993, but the price of coal used in electri-
city was closely regulated. Coal prices were largely libera-
lized after 2002. 
Deregulation in the electricity sector is still under 
way and progress has been slow due to power shortages. 
Although regulation of the electricity market is tighter 
than other energy sectors, electricity tariffs reflect the 
changes in generation costs (particularly coal prices) more 
closely than before. The regulation history of the electricity 
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market is complicated due to the political power possessed 
by electricity facilities. Prior to 1985, electricity supply 
was determined according to central planning and plan 
quotas were allocated to the generation facilities across the 
country. Due to power shortages, the government started 
rate-of-return regulation in the electricity market after 
1985 and took measures to attract private entrepreneurs. 
Independent power producers entered the electricity mar-
ket in the 1990s and public electricity generation and dis-
tribution sectors were decentralized (Cherni and Kentish, 
2007). Transmission, distribution, and end-user tariffs 
have been set by the government (Zhao et al., 2009).
In the natural gas sector, supply shortages and large 
imports have meant that this industry has been under 
tight government regulation. Despite the reduction in 
subsidies, domestic natural gas prices have been subject 
to tight government regulation and have been set below 
global prices (Wu, 2003). The transmission price and the 
reference production price are decided by the government, 
and the retail prices are decided by local governments 
(Zhao et al., 2009). 
Overall, the prices of oil and coal have become in-
creasingly market-oriented, whereas electricity and natu-
ral prices are tightly regulated, albeit dictated by market 
forces to some extent. The end result of the various degrees 
of deregulation and price reforms across energy markets 
is an increase in energy prices, as has been experienced 
in many other countries. In addition, the imbalance in 
the degree of price deregulations has inevitably caused 
disputes between different energy sectors. For example, 
although retail electricity prices remain under govern-
ment control, coal prices have been liberalized (Zhao 
et al., 2009). As a result, regulated electricity prices do 
not necessarily reflect the increases in coal prices (Zhou 
et al., 2010). Since 2006, the government has provided 
large subsidies to energy suppliers in order to address the 
mismatches between regulated electricity and oil product 
prices and the costs of the material inputs for producing 
these energy sources (Zhou et al., 2010).
3. SAM Price Modeling
In the present study we have used the SAM price mode-
ling technique (Roland-Holst and Sancho 1995, Parra 
and Wodon 2008, Akkemik 2011). The SAM price mo-
del is the dual of the quantity-based SAM model. In this 
method, quantities are fixed and prices are allowed to 
change. 
We first transform the input-output table figures, which 
are expressed in monetary terms, to physical units. We then 
rewrite the conventional input-output model expressed in 
monetary values in terms of the dual of the quantity model 
to express the change in the price level of an activity as the 
product of a shock and the price multiplier, which extends 
the initial impact of the exogenous shock to the input-
output relations across activities. Finally, we decompose 
the SAM price multiplier into direct price effects and three 
indirect effects; namely, transfer, open-loop, and closed-
loop effects. Direct price effect measures the effect of a 
change in the price level of an activity on the production 
block itself (activity and commodity accounts combined). 
Transfer effects account for the changes arising from an 
exogenous shock within a group of accounts (such as acti-
vities block, commodities block, and institutions block). 
In the institutions block, the enterprises, the government, 
and the rest of the world’s accounts are all set as exogenous 
and only the households account is endogenous. Transfer 
effects are not allowed within the factors block (capital 
and labor). If the price level of an energy activity account 
changes, transfer effects measure how the changing energy 
cost is multiplied through cost relationships across the 
production activities. 
Open-loop effects measure the effects of an exogenous 
shock across different SAM blocks. The open-loop effect 
resulting from a change in the price level of an energy 
account reflects the interactions of costs across produc-
tion sectors due to the intersectoral cost structure of the 
economy. 
Finally, closed-loop effects measure the magnifying ef-
fect of an exogenous shock on endogenous accounts after 
the circular travel is completed. Circular travel refers to the 
shock’s movement from the production block (activities 
and commodities) to the households account, then to the 
factors block (capital and labor) and then back to the pro-
duction block. In the case of a change in energy prices, the 
closed-loop effect demonstrates the effect that the change 
has on the price levels of the production sectors after affec-
ting households’ price level (cost of living), which then 
affects their factor incomes (revenues from the rendering 
of capital and labor services), and then back to the costs 
of production sectors. The closed-loop effect reflects the 
circular flow diagram. 
The data for the SAM pricing model are organized into 
two SAMs for the years 2002 and 2007. The SAMs have 
35 sectors. The input-output tables used in the construc-
tion of the SAMS for 2002 and 2007 were obtained from 
the National Bureau of Statistics. 
We have conducted some simulations regarding the 
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possible changes in energy prices in the near future as a 
result of the ongoing developments in the energy demand-
supply conditions and the undergoing deregulations in the 
energy markets. We assumed that energy prices are subject 
to increase in the near future due to energy supply shor-
tages and the government’s intentions to remove subsidies. 
In the simulations we allowed energy prices to increase by 
10 percent.
Price multipliers are presented in Table 1. The multi-
pliers represent the impact of 10 percent increases in the 
energy prices on the price levels of 35 economic activities. 
Energy price shocks have the highest impacts on them-
selves. We also compare the results for 2002 and 2007 
and see that this finding holds for both years. The largest 
impact on other sectors’ price levels is observed in the price 
shock given to electricity. Coal price shock had a conside-
rable effect on electricity prices in both 2002 and 2007. 
Natural gas prices had the weakest impact on other sectors’ 
producer prices. In 2002, increasing electricity prices by 
10 percent increased the price level of 10 economic sectors 
by more than 1 percent. In 2007, such an increase affected 
27 sectors in this way. This shows that electricity prices are 
important for sectoral producer prices in China. 
The price multipliers are further decomposed into 
transfer effect and closed-loop effect, as described in sec-
tion 3.2.1. The results of the price multiplier decomposi-
tion are presented in Table 2 for 2002 and in Table 3 for 
2007. Open-loop effects are not reported for production 
accounts because the origin and destination fall into the 
same block, which means that the open-loop effects are 
equal to zero. 
Since we are not interested in income distribution, 
we do not report in detail the results for the institutions 
accounts (households and enterprises). For these accounts, 
transfer and closed-loop effects are null since the account 
of origin and destination are in different blocks, and only 
open-loop effects count. The impact of the price shocks on 
the households account reflects the effect on households’ 
cost of living, which is negligible: between 0.001 (gas, 
2007) and 0.032 (electricity, 2002) percentage points. 
However, among the impact of energy prices on the cost 
of living, electricity prices clearly have the highest impact.
Transfer effects account for the largest portion of price 
multipliers. A strong transfer effect indicates strong inter-
sectoral interaction and hence a high level of integration 
between the shock-giving sector and the destination sec-
tor. From 2002 to 2007, transfer effects of energy price 
rises increased for virtually all sectors, but most notably 
for gas prices. Transfer effects of coal and electricity price 
shocks increased between 10 and 20 percentage points for 
most sectors from 2002 to 2007. The increase was much 
smaller for oil price shock, mostly below 10 percent. The 
transfer effects of the gas price shock were relatively low 
compared to the transfer effects of coal, oil, and electri-
city prices in 2002; however, despite the large increases in 
2007, they remained lower for almost all sectors, which 
indicates that gas has a smaller degree of importance as an 
energy source for the production sectors. 
Closed-loop effects account for the remaining por-
tion of the price multipliers after the transfer accounts 
are counted. Closed-loop effects are relatively small and 
amount to about one third of the price multipliers for 
the coal, oil, and electricity price shocks. This reflects the 
degree of forward linkages by these energy sectors. On the 
other hand, closed-loop effects of gas price shocks domi-
nate the price multipliers, exceeding 50 percent of price 
multipliers in 27 of the 35 sectors in 2002. However, the 
closed loop effects in all energy sectors declined from 2002 
to 2007 in virtually all sectors. Altogether, there are only 
14 instances of increasing closed-loop effects by energy 
price shocks from 2002 to 2007 (out of a total of 136 
cases). Closed-loop effects by coal and electricity dominate 
significantly only in agriculture. In addition, in both years 
(2002 and 2007), the services sectors and food manufactu-
ring (food, beverages, and tobacco) generally exhibit large 
closed-loop effects in response to energy shocks compared 
to other production sectors. This finding reflects the strong 
forward linkages by these sectors with the rest of the eco-
nomy. Closed-loop effects are relatively small in the other 
sectors, implying a relatively low level of linkage effects. 
The abovementioned results indicate that the produc-
tion sectors became increasingly dependent on electricity 
from 2002 to 2007 and much of the price influence ari-
sing from energy price shocks worked through transfer 
effects, with the closed-loop effects being less significant. 
Furthermore, the transfer effects increased for virtually all 
sectors from 2002 to 2007, to the detriment of closed-
loop effects. In other words, the energy price shocks are 
dictated mainly through intersectoral input relations and 
less through the circular flow. In addition, this has been 
strengthened from 2002 and 2007. 
4. Conclusion
The results of our analyses have some policy implications 
for China. The changes in producer prices are transmitted 
to consumer prices and therefore affect the overall price 
level. The results presented in this paper quantitatively 
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demonstrate that changes in electricity prices have the 
greatest effect on producer prices, and the price of coal 
has a direct effect on the price of the generated electricity. 
Any policy measure or shift regarding energy prices should 
also take such effects on the prices of other sectors into 
consideration.
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1. Introduction
This paper argues that efforts to liberalize the Turkish elec-
tricity market may be interrupted and that successful re-
sults may be deferred due to several structural deficiencies 
already present in the market. Specifically, the high rates 
of illegal electricity usage, the burdensome tariff structure 
for the consumers, and the anticompetitive conducts of 
the newly privatised distribution companies that affect the 
entry of independent retail electricity companies to the 
market are the main problems that the Turkish authorities 
face.
It is largely accepted that policies that have helped 
Tukey move towards a free market economy since the 1980s 
have been moderately successful, despite cetain irregulari-
ties and inconsistencies. As an inherent part of this trans-
formation, liberalization of network industries has been 
carried out following the intellectual trends in the world 
and the experiences of the other first-mover countries. 
Nevertheless, experience shows that it is hardly possible 
to have the desired welfare gains from the liberalization 
efforts without establishing the underlying microecono-
mic reforms (that is, rules related to firm and consumer 
behavior). In this regard, it is necessary, but not sufficient, 
to enact the essential rules of the game and conform the 
proper sequencing of legislative and institutional reforms 
for electricity market liberalization. From the point of the 
Turkish practice, regulation and competition policies that 
incorporate a consistent and coherent enforcement of the 
current legislation are more crucial than ever in order to 
promptly deal with market-specific anomalies.
Within this concept, the present paper attempts to en-
capsulate the course of electricity sector reforms in Turkey 
by referring to the abovementioned problems, especially 
the ones regarding the competition issues in the electricity 
distribution and retail level. We then offer some activist 
policy recommendations.
2. The Turkish Experience: Not unique!
The Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK) was established 
to carry out the electricity services as a vertically integrated 
public utility company in 1970. The liberalization activi-
ties and the economic transformation policies that started 
in the early 1980s have not excluded the Turkish electricity 
sector. In this context, and primarily by dint of Law no. 
3096 of 1984, private companies are entitled to operate 
in the fields of electricity generation, distribution, and 
trade. The generation and distribution activities of TEK 
were separated by establishing two publicly owned com-
panies, TEAŞ and TEDAŞ, which indicated the pathway 
of the reform process and the determination of the state on 
liberalization policy. Following the functional separation 
of TEK, private undertakings were motivated in the elec-
tricity sector, especially by Build-Operate (BO) and Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts. Take-or-pay clauses 
were a typical feature of the contracts signed during this 
period. However neither the BO nor the BOT model was 
adequate because of the weak competitive bidding pro-
cess for the privileged rights, misleading pricing policy, 
and improperly drawn contracts (Atiyas, et al., 2012: 22). 
As a result, the ineffective enforcement of BO and BOT 
models led policy makers to seek alternative ways of libera-
lization. Thus, TEAŞ was divided in three functional com-
panies for generation (EÜAŞ), transmission (TEİAŞ) and 
trade (TETAŞ), commencing in the 2000s.
Basically, the abovementioned government actions may 
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be deemed as the preliminary attempts for the following 
liberalization activities. The experiences gained during 
the previous periods affected the subsequent stages of the 
reform process. On this basis, the Electricity Market Law 
(EML) of 2001 established the framework for a competi-
tive market structure and establishment of a functioning 
liberalized electricity industry. Establishing the energy 
regulator, clarifying the privatization strategy and reform 
process (Strategy Document of 2004), and setting out the 
policies regarding the security of energy supply under a 
competitive market (Strategy Document for the Security 
of Supply of 2009) were among the steps that helped esta-
blish this framework. 
One of the prominent attempts introduced by the 
Strategy Document of 2004 was the free consumer policy. 
It specified a smooth pathway towards a liberalized market 
by allowing transition period contracts between the free 
final consumers and the electricity retailers, while allowing 
consumers who are not free to be served only by the regio-
nal distribution/retailer electricity companies. The noti-
ceable improvements to the EML of 2001 have been the 
foundation of a regulatory authority for the energy market 
– the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) – and 
the vertical separation of generation and distribution func-
tions; these have paved the way towards privatization tran-
sactions. The EML also authorized the EMRA to regulate 
and annually revise the consumption limits for the free 
consumers, which aimed to level the playing field for the 
retail competition.
The interventions of the Turkish Competition 
Authority (TCA) during the privatization of the publicly 
owned electricity distribution companies had a remarkable 
influence on the progress of a competitive market struc-
ture. Throughout the privatization process of 21 distribu-
tion regions, the TCA prevented a high level of concentra-
tion by establishing a market share threshold between 30 
and 35 percent for the retail level. The involvement of the 
TCA in the privatization process was noteworthy as there 
were no other policy tools to prevent a private undertaking 
from a significantly high market power by acquiring all or 
most of the distribution regions.
One of the remarkable areas of progress following the 
privatization period has been the acquisition of one of the 
privatised regions (Osmangazi) by a Chinese company. 
Thus, it could be asserted that the Turkish electricity dis-
tribution and retail market is deemed to be promising for 
foreign investors.
Although the main path of the Turkish electricity re-
form followed to date does not have a unique feature that 
distinguishes it from the rest of the world, the indicators 
are encouraging. As a result of all the efforts, the public 
share in the electricity generation fell from 85 percent in 
1998 to 40 percent in 2013. By lowering the free consu-
mer limits, market openness at the retail level increased 
from 23 percent in 2003 to 84 percent in 2013.
It takes two to tango: Electricity theft and tariff 
structure
Apart from the expected improvements in the electricity 
market, the retail level still has deficiencies and does not 
yet exhibit a sufficient level of competition. The current 
tariff regulation and the high level of electricity theft (and 
loss) may be claimed as the two major problems under-
lying this problem.
The EMRA regulates the tariffs, taking into account 
the different user groups (industrial, household, agricultu-
ral irrigation, families of martyrs, etc.) However, the point 
of interest here is that the tariffs approved by the EMRA 
reflect the prices introduced for the nation as a whole; that 
is, a national tariff is applied. The EMRA regulates the 
usage prices considering an equalisation mechanism by 
which it attempts to prevent the gap that would otherwise 
prevail between the cost-based prices and compensation of 
the underdeveloped regions. In this way, the regional cost 
differences are not taken into account, but this is not well-
suited with the incentive regulation. 
As a result of the equalization mechanism, the prices 
for different regions are set to be the same and the higher 
cost regions’ losses are charged by the consumers of the 
other low-cost regions. The other side of the token is that 
the costs of the regions that have high level of electricity 
theft (and loss) are cross-subsidized by the regions with 
lower levels.
Although it is not difficult to identify different sources 
of motives for such a tariff policy (for example, social, 
economic or political motives), it is clear that in order to 
have the desired welfare gains from the privatization and 
liberalization efforts in an electricity market, much more 
effective and incentive-based mechanisms for tariff regu-
lation must be developed. This is because the equalization 
mechanism and the cross-subsidizing policy are not sustai-
nable in the medium and long term, although they may 
serve the short-term interests of the privatized firms by 
allowing them to recoup their high amount of bids. 
The privatized distribution companies are under a re-
gulatory obligation to reach the annual targets for theft 
and loss ratios to which they have committed themselves. 
Nevertheless, the comparison of the actual ratios and the 
committed ones indicates that the tariff policy of EMRA is 
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not well suited to overcome this imperfection. 
Figure 1 illustrates the loss and theft ratios for the 21 
regions in 2013. The figure clearly shows the level of regio-
nal differences regarding the loss and theft ratio is clear. 
The loss and theft ratios of the Dicle and Vangölü dis-
tribution regions are so high that there is no need to try 
to explain the inadequacy of national tariff policy to cope 
with this difference.
The level of loss and theft ratios, which have not chan-
ged much over the years, and the commitments that have 
not been accomplished yet, particularly for the highest 
ratios, enable us to deduce that current tariff policy is not 
sufficient to incentivize the companies to lower them. It 
would not be wrong to be opposed to the existing regula-
tion policy and in favor of a re-designed tariff regulation.
3. Winning the game: Don’t change the rules, obey 
them!
The liberalization process and the electricity market 
reforms are helping to improve the social welfare of the 
Turkish people. Despite the insufficient state of the re-
forms, the abovementioned issues are awaiting a proper 
solution. Leaving aside the problems at the generation and 
wholesale level, a few suggestions could be offered with 
regard to the distribution and retail level.
Firstly, before re-organizing the current tariff regula-
tion, the critical differences between the regional loss and 
theft ratios should be minimized. It seems almost impos-
sible to reach an efficient level of competitive market struc-
ture without decreasing the loss and theft ratios of some 
regions in particular (namely, Dicle, Vangölü, and Aras). 
In this context, reducing the free consumer limits will not 
be a sufficient policy either. One way of dealing with the 
high ratios would be to develop tailor-made projects for 
the specific regions. Surveying the regions in detail and 
finding out the main motives behind the illegal electri-
city usage could yield practical data to develop such regio-
nal policies. As far as the authors could ascertain,  such a 
detailed survey has not been carried out for the regions 
concerned, apart from a few worthy efforts.
Secondly, following the decline of the loss and theft ra-
tios to the desired levels, it would be necessary to evaluate 
the current tariff policy and switch to regional cost-based 
tariff regulation. This tariff structure, combined with the 
competitive pressure from the independent retail compa-
nies, may have an incentive compatibility effect for the 
regional distribution companies to lower their costs.
Lastly, in order to have a competitive retail electricity 
market, it is also necessary to introduce an effective level 
of competition between the independent retailers and the 
retail firms of the current distribution companies. EMRA 
and TCA have faced cases regarding the anticompetitive 
practices of regional distribution companies against the 
independent retail companies. Beyond the sector specific 
regulatory interventions by EMRA, coordinated activities 
of the regulatory authorities (EMRA and TCA) are also 
essential to prevent the anticompetitive conducts of the 
regional distribution companies and clear the way for a 
liberalized electricity market.
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Great efforts have been made in many countries, including 
the EU Member States, other developed countries, deve-
loping economies, and also Turkey, to liberalise electricity 
markets and create a competitive business environment. 
Moreover, the EU has a specific agenda for liberalizing 
energy markets and creating competitive electricity mar-
kets1.  Liberalization and privatization have been among 
the main subjects of political debate and part of govern-
ment agendas in many countries. Once the liberalization 
and privatization process had been completed in these 
countries, there was an expectation that a very competitive 
electricity market would emerge2. However, even though 
the final aim of reaching competitive electricity market 
was clear, finding an efficient legal methodology and im-
plementation of regulation for building competitive mar-
ket has been problematic3.  
The typical regulatory design for constructing compe-
titive electricity markets has involved creating sector-speci-
fic regulations and granting power for all major policies to 
sector regulatory authorities. As a candidate country to the 
EU, Turkey followed the same path and introduced a very 
detailed electricity market regulation, starting from 2001, 
and established Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA) to supervise the liberalization process and then 
oversee the market. Moreover, there has been a huge pri-
vatization program designed to reduce the role of state 
enterprises in Turkey’s electricity sector. This privatization 
process has almost been completed; state companies’ share 
has been reduced to a minority in electricity generation 
1 Even the Introduction of European Commission’s Energy Internet Website 
starts with “Secure, Competitive and Sustainable Energy.” For more on EU 
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(less than 30 percent)4. State companies play no role in 
the distribution and retail of electricity and they also have 
a minority share in the wholesale of electricity (wholesale 
and retail were separated until 2013).
As mentioned above, the process of liberalization and 
privatization in Turkey has been very similar to the process 
in the EU Member States. In the EU, however, enormous 
attention was given to complete liberalization and priva-
tization while the aim of creating competitive electricity 
market was disregarded and competition regulation was 
sidelined for years. One of the reasons for this approach 
was the belief that sector-specific regulations would be suf-
ficient to create competitive markets. Eventually, the elec-
tricity market has proved problematic from a competition 
perspective5. The underlying reason can be found in the 
mistake that the regulators made by basing the regulatory 
program on the idea that, once the market was liberalized 
and privatized, a competitive market would emerge. Non-
realization of competitive market conditions caused im-
mense debate in the EU and Member States. At the same 
time, existing competition regulation was utilized to ease 
some major structural problems that hindered the com-
petition6. However, as the market had already settled and 
there were many competition problems, reaching a com-
petitive electricity market in the EU required more regu-
latory reform7. As a result, this debate process produced 
more complex regulation at the EU level.
In the case of Turkey, a different approach was taken in 
the creation of a competitive electricity market. In terms 
of its regulatory approach, the EMRA has been obliged 
to create competitive energy markets. The rules regulating 
the market consist of many requirements that aim to ac-
complish a competitive electricity market. However, as it 
4 All statistics can be found at Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Agency website: 
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has already been shown that sector-specific regulation can-
not create the expected level of competition, competition 
regulation and the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) 
played an important role in the process. The TCA was 
directly involved with the liberalization and privatization 
process from the beginning because leaving the duty of 
creating competitive market to sector-specific regulation 
alone would not be functional. The privatization process 
in Turkey has proven that a more efficient option, which 
offers more long-lasting solutions, is to create a competi-
tive electricity market via competition regulation.
I. Market Distortions for Competition in 
Electricity Sector 
In order to examine competition problems, it is essential 
to identify the main market distortions in electricity mar-
kets. The basic problem is being dependent on network 
system; there is a requirement to have universal utiliza-
tion of the same infrastructure8. Being dependent on a 
network raises problems of misuse of monopoly rights and 
anticompetitive behaviors of network operators, mainly 
by preventing access to the network or by discriminating 
amongst users of the network9. The second problem is the 
abuse of dominant position by incumbent undertaking. 
In particular, after liberalization the incumbent (mostly 
vertically integrated) exercises its power on the generation 
and retail markets with agreements and pricing policies in 
order to force its rivals out of the market.
The third problem is the market entry problem. There 
are several barriers to entry into electricity markets, such 
as economic scale and extensive regulation10. The mar-
ket entry problem causes the fourth problem, which is 
the horizontal concentration problem; namely, there are 
mainly oligopoly market structures, especially in upstream 
generation and downstream retail markets, which have 
to be competitive. Even joint dominance is very likely. 
Moreover, a complicated shareholding structure appears 
with  complex minority shareholding and joint venture 
structures11. 
The fifth problem, which is usually unsolved, is the 
existence of vertical concentrations or the emergence of 
new and more complex vertically concentrated energy 
groups. This especially involves the bundling of upstream 
8 Hellwig Martin, Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation 
for Network Industries, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective 
Goods Bonn 2008/29. See http://www.coll.mpg.de/publications/
competition-policy-and-sector-specific-regulation-network-industries
9 Kotlowski, Alexander, 2007. Third-Party Access Rights in the Energy Sector: A 
Competition Law Perspective. Utilities Law Review, 16 (3). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073962.
10  See, for example, the detailed analysis at ACER/CEER Annual Report on the 
Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 2012
11 For more, see EU Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors. COM(2006)851 final.
markets with lower level markets; for example, bundling 
network and infrastructure services with generation and 
retail markets. This causes misuse of dominant positions 
in network and infrastructure in order to strengthen their 
positions in generation and retail markets12. This problem 
requires that more attention be paid to the lack of legal 
and/or ownership unbundling13.   
Another issue regarding uncompetitive electricity mar-
ket is convergence, especially electricity and natural gas 
convergence. This problem is neglected by sector-specific 
authorities, as their approach to regulation is mostly more 
technical and narrower and considers electricity or gas as 
separate sectors14.  
There are great similarities between the electricity sec-
tor and other sectors based on networks, such as commu-
nication, transportation, ports, and railroads. Lastly, one 
can argue that all these problems are very similar to each 
other in all countries. Thus, comparing their regulations 
makes more sense in the electricity sector.  
II. Turkish Electricity Market Law and 
Competition 
Building sophisticated sector-specific regulation requires 
that structural problems of competitive electricity markets 
are solved from within. This approach can be seen even in 
the first article of Turkey’s Electricity Market Law (EML), 
which reads: “The purpose of this Law is to ensure the de-
velopment of a financially sound and transparent electri-
city market operating in a competitive environment under 
provisions of civil law and the delivery of sufficient, good 
quality, low cost and environment-friendly electricity to 
consumers and to ensure the autonomous regulation and 
supervision of this market.” Moreover, the Law Regarding 
Organization and Duties of Energy Market Regulatory 
Agency sets one of the main duties of the EMRA as the 
facilitation of a competitive electricity market. As a result, 
there are several references to this duty within the law and 
by-laws. 
A. Competition Regulations within the EML 
Having already been alerted that several problems exist, 
the EML has introduced several ex-ante measures to faci-
12 Van Driessche, Lothar, 2011. Unbundling under the 2nd and 3rd Energy 
Packages and its Effects on Corporate Behaviour in the Energy Sector (September 
5, 2011). MBL-FU Master Paper Series. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2289805.
13 Bogner, Stefan, Gasser, Stephan M., and Rammerstorfer, Margarethe, 2012. 
M&As in European and North American Energy Markets: Implications for the 
Assessment of Legal and Ownership Unbundling – An Event Study Analysis 
(September 14). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146590.
14 Künneke, Rolf W., 2009. Convergence of Gas and Electricity Markets: 
Economic and Technological Drivers. In Handbook Utility Management, 
Springer, pp. 263–278.
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litate competition in the electricity market, which can be 
classified under three basic principles.
According to the EML, there is a principle of open, 
non-discriminatory access to networks, and tariff control 
for monopolies. The aim of this principle is to prevent 
network operators from abusing monopoly rights. It is also 
important to provide access to the market by guaranteeing 
open access for essential facilities. Consequently, there are 
several provisions within regulations to provide open and 
non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribu-
tion networks and control of tariffs for these services. 
Another principle taken by the EML is the introduction 
of market caps within the EML. Accordingly, no underta-
king can own more than 20 percent of generation capacity 
in Turkey and no undertaking can own more than 20% 
of retail capacity. Even though it is contrary to free mar-
ket principles, the aim of the market cap rule is obviously 
to prevent horizontal concentration. Moreover, the cap of 
20 percent is a more severe measure than competition law 
would impose. Having already strict market caps means, 
in theory, that there is no requirement for concentration 
control; all mergers and acquisition and new licensing will 
be evaluated accordingly and most concentrations will be 
prevented by the EMRA even before the TCA control. 
The third main principle introduced by the EML is 
unbundling. Under the EML, several measures are taken 
in order to unbundle services. The main policy in the law 
is legal unbundling, which sometimes comes with orga-
nizational unbundling. There is also de facto ownership 
unbundling, as the transmission company with a mono-
poly right remains a state-owned company and the energy 
exchange monopoly company is mixed owned but control-
led by Borsa Istanbul. With regard to legal unbundling, 
generation, distribution, and retail services are required to 
be legally unbundled (permission to vertical concentra-
tion). However, there is a requirement for organizational 
unbundling between distribution companies and a desi-
gnated retail company (under the same ownership with 
the distribution company) and generation companies; 
these companies under the same business groups must 
have separate managements. Distribution companies must 
appoint separate management teams from retail compa-
nies and the members of these teams cannot have any ma-
nagement connection to generation and retail companies. 
Additionally, extensive power is granted to the EMRA to 
impose further unbundling requirements: “In order to fa-
cilitate competitive market, the EMRA can introduce rule 
and standards to regulate relationships amongst underta-
kings; and if these standards require, ownership, legal or 
account unbundling, take necessary measures.” 
III. Persistent Problems that cannot be solved by 
the EML and require Competition Law Intervention 
Despite increasing regulation in order to establish com-
petitive electricity markets, several problems remain 
unsolved15. The first regards the definition of underta-
king and dealing with joint ventures and the sharehol-
ding structure of energy companies. The EML regulates 
companies while competition law regulates undertakings. 
Another problem is the definition of the market; while 
electricity market regulation simply defines a few main 
services, competition regulation usually has several sub-le-
vel market definitions. This changes the method of dealing 
with horizontal concentration by considering market defi-
nitions, which includes upstream and downstream mar-
kets (such as regional markets or markets based on energy 
source portfolio). Another problem is associated with verti-
cal concentration; because there are very few requirements 
for ownership unbundling, any business group might own 
vertically integrated energy companies (even though they 
are legally unbundled). Therefore, huge efforts have been 
made to unbundle energy groups within Europe and other 
countries. As a result, even though networks are some-
how unbundled from other services, there is still a strong 
concentration between generation and retail, which must 
be dealt with. Another important issue to be considered 
is the convergence problem. In particular, by converging 
natural gas services with electricity services, energy groups 
could create sector giants that eventually cause huge mar-
ket entry problems. While convergence is one of the most 
vital issues for a competitive market, sector-specific regu-
lations have no rules regarding convergence. 
IV. Competitive Electricity Market in Turkey: The 
TCA Interference 
According to the general principles of competition regula-
tion, the TCA ex-ante interferes with the electricity mar-
ket while applying control of concentration, and ex-post 
while investigating of competition infringements. In both 
stages, the TCA may demand structural and behavioural 
remedies to create a competitive market environment. 
Even though the universal power of the TCA for elec-
tricity market is well settled by Turkish Council of State 
decisions, intervention by the TCA might create conflict 
between the market regulatory authority and the compe-
tition authority. Rather than going through a number of 
decisions by the TCA regarding electricity market, I will 
examine the approach taken by the TCA in order to solve 
main competition-related problems and potential struc-
15 The TCA published an Electricity Sector Report in 2015. See http://www.reka-
bet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2F1%2FDocuments%2FG%C3%BCncel%2FD
iger%2FELEKTR%C4%B0K+SEKT%C3%96R+RAPORU+08+01+2015+(3).
pdf.
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ture of the market. 
TCA approach regarding horizontal concentration: Since 
2001, the TCA has been involved with the privatization 
of distribution companies (it was bundled with retail ser-
vices) and generation companies. There are 21 distribution 
monopoly regions and only one single transmission com-
pany in Turkey. Even before privatization, the initial aim 
of the TCA was to create ownership unbundling between 
distribution and retail. However, this idea was ignored by 
the privatization authorities. After bidding was completed, 
the TCA introduced several conditions for bundled distri-
bution and retail companies to be transferred to private 
owners. These conditions were supplementary to existing 
ones within electricity regulation. 
Accordingly, regarding the distribution and retail mar-
kets, the TCA stated that distributions services are natu-
ral monopolies and are heavily regulated; this means that, 
in theory, ownership concentration should not matter. 
However, the privatization of bundled company with dis-
tribution and retail services meant that the privatization 
of retail market is a good deal. In view of that, the TCA 
stated that the electricity market contains two competitive 
services: generation and retail. Thus, horizontal and verti-
cal concentration and the structure of electricity company 
groups are essential to competitive markets and should be 
examined carefully. Moreover, in retail services, consumers’ 
freedom of choice would be established as non-free consu-
mers would soon disappear (from 2016). Thus, the market 
share of the designated retail company (bundled with the 
distribution company) is crucial, as they were privatized 
with current customer portfolios. More to the point, with 
the careful examination of reciprocal agreements in the 
electricity sector, the power of privatized retail companies 
as buyers and sellers would play a significant role, at two 
levels. First-level commercial activity happens between 
generation and retail companies. At this level, buyer’s 
power (especially retail companies’ power) is important. 
Second-level commercial activity happens between retail 
companies and end users. Here, the market portfolio of 
retail companies has to be restricted, as markets would 
be free in a few years’ time and must remain competitive. 
Accordingly, even though there was no market cap in law 
for distribution portfolio (bundled with retail), the TCA 
introduced a market cap of 30 percent of Turkey. This de-
cision is important as several electricity groups with retail 
services currently exist in Turkey.
Regarding the privatization of generation capacities, 
many such decisions have been made regarding small, 
medium, and large generation companies in recent years. 
More than 30 percent of the total capacity in Turkey was 
transferred to private companies. Generation services are 
very dispersed in Turkey, with the largest group (after the 
state company) owning approximately 8 percent of the 
total capacity. However, the TCA still conducts a detailed 
examination by considering portfolio-based market share 
and the share of groups in narrower relevant geographic 
markets. The TCA hinted that it would not permit regio-
nal generation concentration or portfolio-based genera-
tion concentration16.  
The TCA approach regarding vertical concentration: The 
TCA conducts a very detailed examination for the portfo-
lio of the undertakings for generation and retail. The TCA 
stated that there could be competition problems if gene-
ration and retail are concentrated under the same group 
without determining the threat limit of vertical concen-
tration. Since no energy group owns more than 8 percent 
of generation, no decision has been made regarding the 
upper limit of concentration. 
The TCA approach regarding converging markets: The 
TCA stated that electricity and natural gas are very strictly 
connected markets; this is because, in retail markets, elec-
tricity and gas providers can be strong potential compe-
titors. Also, electricity and gas retail companies indicate 
similar market conditions and undertaking structures. 
Accordingly, the TCA decided that, after careful examina-
tion of the ownership structure of companies’ gas distribu-
tion areas, convergence of gas and electricity retails in the 
same geographical area would not be permitted. 
The TCA approach regarding access to networks: Since 
market liberalization and privatization processes have 
started, there have been many complaints regarding com-
petition infringements. These complaints have mostly 
regarded the abuse of monopoly positions by vertically 
integrated electricity companies and the avoidance of 
agreements for essential facilities by denial or discrimi-
nation of access to networks. Moreover, there are several 
complaints regarding margin squeeze. These complaints 
prove that sector-specific regulation is not efficient to pre-
vent network abuse because market regulation only covers 
certain abuse of network possibilities. However, underta-
kings are very inventive in terms of finding unregulated or 
grey areas for denying access to a network. It is well known 
that competition regulation considers not only regulated 
access rules, but also every aspect of network operation. 
Therefore, one can easily conclude that the flexible design 
of competition laws makes it better equipped to coun-
terchallenge the ongoing problems, and more suitable to 
regulate network access.
Comparative Examination of the EU Competition Cases: 
Recent decisions regarding electricity markets in the EU 
taken by the Commission and by national Competition 
Authorities in some Member States have proven that 
16 See, for example, the TCA Decision regarding Hamitabat Generation Plant in 
2013 Case no: 13-17/247-122.
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market-specific regulation should be abandoned in favor 
of competition regulation. For example, one of the most 
important cases regarding competition law infringements 
in the EU was the German electricity market decision17, 
which highlights several reasons why market-specific regu-
lation failed. First, the market-specific regulation could 
not prevent the emergence of a very concentrated market. 
Once the regulation failed to create a competitive market, 
it caused more competition problems. In the German case, 
E-ON, RWE, and Vattenfall had a total of 77 percent of 
generation (especially cheap generation). Moreover, it was 
very difficult to enter the market due to the idle capacity 
and connection of undertakings to each other through 
ownership and long-term contracts. 
Accordingly, this structure was causing manipulation 
in spot markets through the abuse of dominant positions 
by capacity withdrawal, as undertakings were intentional-
ly not using some generation facilities (especially cheaper 
ones). This affected competition in the entire electricity 
sector as spot market manipulation affects the reciprocal 
agreement market and the derivative market. Also, hori-
zontal and vertical concentrated undertakings were so 
powerful that they deterred rivals from investing by offe-
ring them long-term contracts or selling them minority 
shares. Another problem was vertical concentration, as the 
transmission network (and therefore the stabilization mar-
ket) was owned and operated by a company group (E-ON) 
that also owned a lot of generation and retail capacity. 
As a result, the Commission had to interfere with the 
structure of undertakings in order to find a long-term 
solution by imposing structural remedies. Accordingly, 
undertakings were forced to transfer some generation ca-
pacity (different portfolio) in order to reduce horizontal 
concentration. Additionally, in order to reduce the level 
of vertical concentration, E-ON was forced to handover 
the transmission and operation of exchange companies to 
independent third parties. 
V. Predicting the Future in the Electricity Market: 
Why Competition Regulation should be used 
The constant changes in technology and market condi-
tions mean that the electricity market is very dynamic. 
However, sector-specific regulation is based on static rules 
rather than principles. Hence, even though the definition 
in sector-specific regulation hardly changes, from a compe-
tition law perspective there is a constant change in market 
definitions. For example, downstream market definitions 
within the universal market, regional markets, or portfo-
17 Cases. COMP/39.388 German Electricty Wholesale Market and Cases. 
COMP/39.389 German Electricty Balancing Market. For discussion, see Philippe 
Chauve, Martin Godfried, Kristóf Kovács, Gregor Langus, Károly Nagy, Stefan 
Siebert, The E.ON electricity cases: an antitrust decision with structural remedies 
Competition Policy Newsletter Number 1 — 2009 http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/publications/cpn/2009_1_13.pdf.
dossier
lio-based definition for generations, or marketing chan-
nels for retail can be defined differently. Consequently, an 
important challenge is preventing concentrations within 
the downstream sections. Also, when the technology, ge-
neration, and marketing structure change, there could be 
new market definitions. For example, convergence is a cri-
tical challenge to market definition. Electricity retail and 
gas retail can be defined as a single market. Thus, from a 
competition law perspective, the existence of the gas retail 
market as a potential rival to electricity retail is essential. 
In this scenario, horizontal concentration can only be pre-
vented by competition regulation. 
On the other hand, past experience indicates that 
market consolidations are imminent in electricity sectors, 
which makes it more likely that a market will have hori-
zontally and vertically integrated energy giants with an oli-
gopolistic market structure. As a result, there is a constant 
change in the structure of undertakings, resulting in a 
more complex ownership structure with joint ventures and 
minority shares. Therefore, only competition regulation 
and competition authority and competition regulation are 
able to solve this problem, by taking dramatic measures 
such as forbidding minority shareholdings in competing 
companies. 
Another important expectation is that, as long as there 
is a strict rule for ownership unbundling, there will be a 
rush to vertical concentration of distribution, generation, 
and retail. This raises the question of how best to apply 
unbundling rules, as the whole idea behind unbundling is 
facilitating a competitive market. However, as unbundling 
is conducted by sector-specific regulation, there is always 
a gap. Thus, more strict and up-to-date solutions can be 
produced by competition regulation because there is a re-
quirement to introduce dramatic structural and behavioral 
measures. 
Past experience has also shown that access to networks 
will always be problematic and cannot be solved by static 
rules of market-specific regulation. Thus, competition au-
thorities are better qualified than sector-specific regulators 
to determine access to network conditions, as any use of 
networks could demonstrate different characteristics over 
time and in line with technological developments. 
In conclusion, the Turkish experience and comparative 
examination prove that detailed competition rules in sec-
tor-specific regulation make the operations of the electri-
city markets more complicated for regulators, authorities, 
and undertakings. Sector-specific authorities do not have 
the basic understanding or the regulatory tools necessary 
to apply competition at expected level. When competition 
authorities interfere, this usually conflicts with sector-spe-
cific regulations and conflict of authority may even arise 
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between authorities. Undertakings are confused because, 
despite obeying the decisions of the market regulatory 
agency, they might still be subjected to competition au-
thorities’ scrutiny and sometimes harsh decisions. In order 
to create competitive electricity market, competition rules 
in sector-specific regulation should be abandoned and 
more general principles based on competition regulations 
should be applied in electricity markets.  
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1. Introduction
Fixed-mobile substitution (FMS) has been one of the most 
important issues in telecommunications markets in recent 
years and has had significant impacts on the regulatory 
governance in the EU and Turkey. While technology and 
the economic structure of telecommunications markets 
have changed substantially with FMS, regulators have 
tended to take a conservative attitude toward FMS. This 
attitude is not neutral among market participants. The 
divergence between economic structure and legal environ-
ment has a redistributional effect on telecommunications 
markets. As fixed and mobile markets have become close 
substitutes in terms of consumer preferences and supply-
side considerations, the distinction between mobile and 
fixed networks has lost its importance in terms of market 
demand. Despite this, regulatory regimes have remained 
suspicious of the consequences of FMS, and the asym-
metry between regulatory frameworks and market realities 
has opened doors to wealth transfers and rent-seeking acti-
vities in these markets. Regulatory process has turned into 
a strategic game between operators and regulatory agencies 
(Cetin and Oguz, 2007: 1763). 
Turkey is no exception to this trend. The Turkish re-
gulatory agency – the Information and Communications 
Technologies Authority (ICTA) – continues to analyze 
relevant markets under the conventional theories of natu-
ral monopoly and bottleneck monopoly. However, these 
theories have become questionable with the emergence of 
FMS. The bottleneck monopoly of the fixed line network 
no longer exists. All of the major variables in the market 
show the existence of FMS. 
A recent article on the regulatory policy in telecom-
munications asked, ‘Is fixed-mobile substitution strong 
enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony?’ (Briglauer et 
al., 2011). At the time that article was published, the ques-
tion was more relevant than it is now, given that FMS is 
stronger now. Incumbents in many countries still thought 
there was chance to keep incomes growing, even if market 
shares were falling. The changes in the last two years have 
solidified FMS around the world. Technological advances 
have pushed consumers to mobile networks. Moreover, 
mobile operators have had the advantage of being in a 
competitive market, whereas fixed operators were tightly 
regulated. Consequently, the asymmetric regulation acce-
lerated FMS, particularly in countries with highly compe-
titive mobile markets.
In many developed countries, FMS in voice is now 
well established. Data services have followed the same his-
torical trend in terms of substitution and convergence of 
services. The evidence in broadband is ambiguous and the 
issue has not been settled yet. Apparently, broadband has 
also followed the path of voice. In Austria and the Czech 
Republic, for example, national regulatory authorities 
endorsed FMS in broadband and these decisions were 
supported by BEREC (BEREC, 2012). However, the 
EU Commission took a negative attitude toward FMS in 
broadband, which created a tension between BEREC and 
the EU Commission. 
Since FMS, it has become important to ask whether 
there is a case for deregulation of fixed and mobile broa-
dband markets. If so, the regulatory challenges and the 
inertia of regulatory authorities make the regulatory envi-
ronment an impediment to competition. 
If fixed and mobile services were substitutes, different 
regulations would not be appropriate and would have 
anti-competitive effects. Both regulatory and competition 
policy toward telecommunications industry would have 
to be redesigned. This would necessitate a new market 
definition. 
Until recently, the literature referred to the changing 
environment in telecommunications markets and conver-
gence between alternative platforms. Intermodal com-
petition was expected. The question to discuss was what 
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would happen if the new institutional framework replaced 
the old rationale of ex ante regulation (Shelanski, 2007). 
Telecommunications markets have reached a point where 
the bottleneck monopoly of fixed-line networks is expec-
ted to be something of the past. In most countries, howe-
ver, the regulatory environment has remained intact. 
As a result of these changes, both national and interna-
tional regulators face a dilemma. The divergence between 
the policy goals of embracing technological advances 
and protecting jurisdictional powers of regulatory bodies 
creates regulatory difficulties. The divergence between 
economic reality and legal framework encourages rent-
seeking activities (Barzel, 1997). The increasing distance 
between economic incentives and regulatory structure 
creates asymmetric regulation between firms competing 
for the same consumer base.
In principle, the implementation of any regulation 
must be on the basis of its effects on social welfare. It has to 
create net social benefits. This principle requires regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA) to be part of decision-making. 
The lack of RIA in most decisions appears to be one reason 
why regulators remain reluctant to change anti-competi-
tive regulations. FMS provides a good illustration of the 
drawbacks of keeping the old regime despite changes in 
the market structure. 
2. Stylized facts on FMS
This section highlights the major findings of the litera-
ture on FMS, without offering a detailed discussion of the 
literature. 
First, as markets evolve and saturate, substitution be-
comes dominant. In 2005, for example, demand elastici-
ties for fixed-line services were lower than those for mo-
bile services (Garbacz and Thompson, 2007; Vogelsang, 
2010). This has since changed. Mobile phones, as part of 
the culture of the modern consumer, have become more 
important than fixed phones (Gideon and Gabel, 2011; 
Grzybowski, 2012). FMS starts in usage and then moves 
to access. Consumers initially keep their fixed-line phones 
and increase their usage of mobile phones, before eventual-
ly “cutting the cord” on their fixed phones. As a corollary 
of the evolving and saturation of markets, network exter-
nalities lose their importance as the country becomes more 
developed. This aspect of transition weakens the natural 
monopoly-based arguments of regulatory authorities. 
Second, substitution is not transitory but redefines the 
telecommunications markets. FMS is not just a change in 
subscriber or traffic numbers. The behavorial patterns of 
consumers shift toward mobile-only services. The insti-
tutional structure of telecommunications markets evolves 
into a market setting other than the traditional natural 
monopoly model. Empirical studies find that access is 
more inelastic than calls (Briglauer et al., 2011). Empirical 
studies tend to underestimate FMS, as they mostly use 
mobile and fixed-line subscription numbers rather than 
disaggregated traffic data. 
Third, substitution is self-enforcing. FMS increases 
faster because of network effects and its effects on rela-
tive prices (Vogelsang, 2010). Supply-side cost reductions 
and demand side price effects make FMS stronger. The 
increasing role of relative prices in determining consumer 
choices also reflects the fact that the quality of service in 
fixed and mobile services are becoming closer. In many 
countries, mobile operators offer broadband internet ser-
vice at prices (for the same download speeds and limits) 
similar to fixed-line operators.  
Fourth, over-regulation increases social costs of regula-
tion. While FMS gets stronger, regulators do not usually 
take a proactive position on the issue. Mobile telecommu-
nications markets are lightly regulated compared to fixed-
line markets around the world (Barth and Heimeshoff, 
2012). The divergence creates two negative effects. First, 
the existence of asymmetric regulation encourages rent-
seeking activities for wealth transfers. Mobile operators 
can offer products to the market very quickly. Fixed-line 
operators must usually go through a lengthy regulatory 
approval process. Second, it gives way to over-regulation. 
Regulators make rules more complicated and detailed ra-
ther than revoking them to resolve market failures. The 
limited applicability of RIA makes accountability of regu-
latory policy difficult. While the economic consequences 
of FMS support the deregulation of fixed networks, the 
existing regulatory environment increases the costs of im-
proving competition in the telecommunications markets.
3. The Turkish Experience
FMS is one of the most crucial issues in the Turkish tele-
communications market. It was not until 2014 that the 
ICTA endorsed the existence of FMS. In that same year, 
the ICTA conducted a survey on a number of issues in 
telecommunications including the existence of FMS. The 
survey signaled the existence of FMS in voice. As a result, 
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the ICTA deregulated fixed voice at the retail level in its 
third round of market analysis.  However, the economic 
reality of FMS has not materialized in the regulatory 
process of market definition. The ICTA still defines the 
relevant market contrary to the reality of FMS. On one 
hand, the agency determines the existence of FMS and 
to deregulate the retail fixed voice market. On the other 
hand, ICTA does not endorse to define the mobile and 
fixed voice as a single market. It causes an inconsistency 
between economic and legal rights and encourages opera-
tors to lobby for wealth transfers. 
This inconsistency has slowed down the improvement 
of competition in the Turkish telecommunications in-
dustry. The ICTA should redesign its market definition for 
relevant markets in accordance with FMS. Otherwise, the 
asymmetry between regulations and market realities will 
become an arena for strategic behavior between operators 
and government. 
Turkey’s regulatory framework has been established on 
the same pillars of the EU, but the ICTA applies a three-
criteria test, starting with the wholesale levels. However, 
the market analysis should begin with the retail markets. If 
the retail market is sufficiently competitive, the regulation 
of the wholesale market becomes unnecessary. However, 
the ICTA’s approach assumes that bottleneck monopoly 
and natural monopoly are still the theoretical underpin-
ning for its market analysis. It generates a complex regula-
tory structure that is inconsistent with the economic rea-
lity. The economic reality of FMS, which was endorsed by 
the ICTA, does not address the fundamental problem as it 
rejects defining the relevant market as single-voice market. 
If the ICTA endorses the single-voice market, any opera-
tors – including the fixed-line incumbent, Türk Telekom – 
would not be an SMP operator or dominant undertaking. 
Redesigning the relevant market definition in parallel with 
the reality of FMS shows the competitive structure of a 
single-voice market. The ICTA’s approach has created an 
artificial relevant market that is contrary to the existing 
substitution between fixed and mobile networks.
The Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) has also 
resisted accepting the existence of FMS. TCA does not 
endorse the reality of FMS and has resisted redesigning 
a relevant market definition as a single-voice market. In a 
recent decision,  the TCA hypothetically analyzed the rele-
vant market as a single-voice market and found that the 
largest mobile operator, Turkcell, was not a dominant firm 
in the relevant single-voice market. In other words, none 
of the undertakings is dominant in the single-voice mar-
ket.  The problem with TCA’s approach is that it endorsed 
the single-voice market as a hypothetical analysis but does 
not endorse it in reality. 
FMS in broadband in Turkey is also an important phe-
nomenon  given the significant number of subscribers to 
mobile internet services.  Penetration rates between fixed 
and mobile also support the argument in favor of FMS in 
broadband.  Contrary to the FMS in voice, ICTA does 
not endorse FMS in broadband (ICTA, 2013: 79). It does 
not define or regulate the broadband internet services at 
the retail level. The strong relationship between FMS and 
market definition  indicates that the deregulated broad-
band internet services market at the retail level theoreti-
cally proves the existence of FMS in broadband. ICTA 
regulates the wholesale broadband access market as it does 
in the wholesale market. It has determined Türk Telekom 
as the SMP operator. ICTA’s problematic point of view for 
the voice market exists for the FMS in broadband as well. 
In a similar vein, TCA also rejects FMS and the definition 
of a single broadband market in its relevant product mar-
ket analysis in the cases  of Türk Telekom and TTNET, a 
subsidiary of Türk Telekom and incumbent operator for 
wireline broadband market, which were accused of abu-
sing their dominant position in the vertically integrated 
broadband market. 
In sum, even though the economic reality of FMS 
compels national regulatory authorities to redefine and re-
design the relevant markets, ICTA still continues to define 
relevant markets in a conventional manner. This approach 
creates an inconsistency between the economic reality and 
conventional market definition based on the theories of 
bottleneck monopoly and natural monopoly. The result is 
a decrease in social welfare and an increase in transaction 
costs for market participants. 
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conferences
The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process at the global level. As this 
process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, which generally call for more, rather than less regulatory inter-
vention. Yet, the question about the right mixture between market, economic, technical and social regulation 
remains wide open in all the network industries. 
The question becomes even more challenging when looking at infrastructure development in different regions 
as, at least in some of the network industries, the gap between regulatory assets in different countries is very 
wide. Most of the European countries have a long lasting story of national regulation and have then started to 
put considerable effort in harmonising their regulation at the EU level. Outside the EU, regulation of network 
industries has followed its own path, according to the necessities of the country or the macro-region. Despite 
the different stages of network industries regulation, mutual learning processes might be possible and actually 
welcome, in the light of an ever more connected world. 
This 4th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures aims at taking stock of the major challenges 
infrastructure regulation is currently facing in the main infrastructure sectors (notably telecommunications, 
postal services, electricity, gas, railways, air transport, urban public transport, as well as water distribution and 
sanitation), paying attention to the mutual understanding effort that the regulators have to undertake. We will 
look at infrastructure regulation from various disciplinary approaches (notably engineering, economics, law and 
political science) and we will aim at linking an academic approach to practical relevance.
The list of selected authors and their abstracts are available on the dedicated webpage. If you are willing to 
participate to the conference as discussant or attendee, please contact FSR.Transport@eui.eu.  
Scientific Committee
• Prof. Matthias Finger (EPFL and EUI, Director of the Transport Area of FSR)
• Prof. Jean-Michel Glachant (Director of the Energy Area of FSR)
• Prof. Leigh Hancher (Director of the EU Energy Law & Policy Area)
• Prof. Xavier Labandeira (Director of the Climate Policy Research Unit of FSR)
• Prof. Pier Luigi Parcu (Director of the Communications and Media Area of FSR)
• Prof. Ignacio Pérez Arriaga (MIT, Comillas and EUI, Director of the Energy Training of FSR)
• Prof. Stéphane Saussier (IAE de Paris and FSR, Director of the Water Area of FSR)
Organized by: the Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute)
in collaboration with: 
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conferences
Overview
Network industries offer a highly interesting research area, 
as business operations generally need to account for both 
competition and regulation. Adequate performance is 
only reached by balancing economic efficiency and reaso-
nable profits with public interests and investment needs. 
Especially the relationship between liberalization and re-
gulation of monopolies or monopolistic bottlenecks dea-
ling with public needs creates multi-disciplinary research 
questions related to corporate governance. In particular, 
market-oriented corporate governance mechanisms might 
not perfectly work in a partly monopolistic environment.
The conference intends to bring together academics, pro-
fessionals and representatives of governments and opera-
tors. The aim is to address key issues in network industries 
arising from the intersection of regulation and competi-
tion on the one hand and corporate governance on the 
other hand.
Conference Structure
The conference on corporate governance in network in-
dustries will be held at the new campus of the WU Vienna 
University of Economics and Business in Austria on Octo-
ber 28 and 29, 2015. The conference is jointly organized by 
the Institute for Corporate Governance (WU), the Chair 
Management of Network Industries (NI, EPFL), and the 
Florence School of Regulation (EUI) supported by the 
WU Research Institute of Regulatory Economics. Accep-
ted conference papers can be submitted to a Special Issue 
of the Journal Utilities Policy. Each day of the conference 
will open with a Keynote Speech on new issues on corpo-
rate governance in network industries.
We would like to invite you to submit an extended abs-
tract or a full paper dealing with research topics, inclu-
ding but not restricted to:
• The specifics of corporate governance mechanisms in 
infrastructure and network industries
• Economic regulation of infrastructure industries (inclu-
ding electricity, telecoms, gas, water and other infrastruc-
ture industries such as airports, postal services, etc.) and 
its relation to corporate governance
• Boundaries and overlaps between regulation and corpo-
rate governance for utilities and networks
• The processes of de- and re-regulation, as well as pri-
vatization, and their implications on the corporate gover-
nance of the involved firms
• Corporate governance of state-owned infrastructure 
firms
We would welcome both theoretical and empirical papers, 
including case study work. If you want to be considered 
for publication in the special issue, a full paper needs to be 
submitted. Each presenter will have 20 minutes to present 
followed by comments from an assigned discussant, plus 
general discussion. If you are not willing to act as an assig-
ned discussant, please let us know prior to the conference.
Extended abstracts/Papers and all other queries should be 
sent to CGNI@wu.ac.at. 
More information will be provided at www.wu.ac.at/icg/
cgni.
Important dates
Submission deadline: 31st May 2015
Notification of acceptance: 30th August 2015
Provisional program/start of registration: 2nd September 
2015
Final program and end of registration: 16th October 2015
Organizing committee and editors
Anne d’Arcy (WU)
Francisca Bremberger (WU)
Matthias Finger (EPFL NI & EUI)
Klaus Gugler (WU)
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announcements
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) has been created in 2004 as a partnership between the European 
University Institute (EUI) and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER). Since then, the Florence 
School of Regulation has expanded from Energy regulation to Telecommunications and Media (2009), Trans-
port (2010) and Water (2014).
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR Transport) is concerned with the regulation of 
all the transport modes and transport markets (including the relationship among them). It currently focuses 
on regulation and regulatory policies in railways, air transport, urban public transport, intermodal transport, 
as well as postal and delivery services.
The aim of FSR Transport is:
• to freely discuss topics of concern to regulated firms, regulators and the European Commission by way of 
stakeholder workshops;
• to involve all the relevant stakeholders in such discussions; and
• to actively contribute to the evolution of European regulatory policy by way of research.
The core activity of FSR Transport is the organization of policy events, where representatives of the European 
Commission, regulatory authorities, operators, other stakeholders, as well as academics in the field meet to 
shape regulatory policy in matters of European transport.
The results of FSR Transport’s activities are disseminated by way of policy briefs, working papers and acade-
mic publications. All FSR Transport materials are open source and available on the FSR Transport webpage, as 
they aim to involve professors, young academics and practitioners to become part of a unique open platform 
for applied research. 
To learn more visit our website: www.florence-school.eu or contact us at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
Latest Publication:
Date Title
 20 April 2015 7th Florence Air Forum
18 May 2015 10th Florence Rail Forum
 12 June 2015 4th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
For more information about our activities please contact: FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
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FSRManifesto: An EU agenda for the upcoming 5 years of regulation of infrastructures
The FSR Manifesto is the first systematic attempt that the Florence School of Regulation 
has done to critically reflect upon the achievements of the second Barroso Commission 
in the various network industries. It also endeavors to establish a realistic outlook onto 
the challenges that await the Juncker Commission in the various network industries in 
terms of regulatory policy. 
On the basis of FSR 10-year experience, four Area Directors and respective Research 
Associates have been observing, analysing and making policy recommendations in the 
areas of energy, communications and media, transport and water regulation.
FSR-Transport upcoming events: 
